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1. Overview: Why does the EU need more rather than less legal 
migration? 
 
In the early 21st century the European Union is confronted with an ageing population, 
stagnating or even declining native populations, high unemployment and modest 
economic growth. Between 2001 and 2005, in the EU-27 GDP per capita grew on 
average by 1.4% per year (EU-15: +1.1% p.a.; EU-12: +4.9% p.a.).1 At the same time, 
unemployment rates remained at high levels: 9% on average in the EU-27 (EU-15: 8%; 
EU-12: 13%) compared to 4-5% in the US.  
 
However, in order to respond effectively to the challenges and opportunities of 
globalisation, European policy makers recognise that the EU has to become a more 
innovative and competitive economic player.2 One important tool for achieving this 
goal is immigration. Carefully managed immigration could lead to younger, more 
dynamic European societies by enhancing the exchange of people and ideas. This could 
stimulate risk-taking, foster the modernisation of European economies and 
communities, help to overcome rigid structures, and lead to higher economic growth. 
 
Europe’s demographic prospects might imply unsought socio-economic 
consequences because of stagnating or even declining native populations. Between 
2000 and 2006 today’s 27 EU Member States altogether still recorded a small excess of 
births over deaths and considerable net gains from international migration. Over the 
last decade, however, Europe’s old age dependency ratio3 grew on average by 1.3% per 
year in the EU-25, reaching 25% in 2005.4 This means that in the EU-27 there are 25 
persons of age over 65 per 100 persons at working age (15-64). 
 
Demographic ageing combined with slow growth in the numbers of gainfully 
employed people (on average +0.9% per year between 2001 and 2005), as well as high 
unemployment rates, welled to a situation where the employed work force and 
taxpayers in general have to bear growing welfare and social expenditure. Future 
projections estimate that the situation will worsen further in the coming decades 
when the “baby boomers” born in the 1950’s and 1960’s will reach retirement age. 
 
In recent years, Europe’s population increase (EU-27: +1.5 to +2.0 million per 
year) was mainly driven by immigration. On the world map of international migration 
the EU has become one of the main destinations. From a historical perspective, this is a 
relatively new phenomenon. The EU-27 is home or host to some 40.6 million legally 
established international migrants, representing about 8.3% of its total population (see 
Table 2). Of them some 27.3 million (5.6% of total population) have come from third 
countries while 13.2 million (2.7%; Table 2) have moved from one of today’s 27 EU 
Member States to another EU country. 
 
In contrast to demographic realities, many Europeans still do not see their 
homelands as prime destinations for international migrants, nor do they assume that 
immigration could turn into a permanent and possibly even necessary process. Today, 
this contra-factual perception of demographic realities has become a major obstacle 
                                                 
1 Source: EUROSTAT; own calculations. 
2 Council of the European Union (2006). 
3 Population aged 65+ divided by population aged 15 to 64. 
4 Source: EUROSTAT; own calculations. 
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for the management of migration and the implementation of proactive migration 
regimes. 
 
In many EU Member States economic immigration has traditionally been 
characterised by guest worker schemes implemented during economic boom periods or 
sectoral labour market shortages. This orientation is partly due to the concern that 
immigration may lead to a burden for the treasury and worries that immigrants might 
put a downward pressure on wages and native employment. As a result, in many 
Western European countries the humanitarian5 reasons were more important for 
admission of long-term migrants than the economic ones. 
 
In recent debates on immigration, we can identify a paradigmatic shift. While in 
the past immigration was perceived rather as a fiscal burden or even as a threat to 
national identity and social cohesion, today, many deplore a lack of integration of 
immigrants resulting from their different ethnic and religious background. Due to 
perceived integration difficulties in particular of Muslim migrant communities and in 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London, scepticism 
about immigration – in particular from Islamic countries – has been expressed. 
 
At the same time the pro-active recruitment of migrants is now seen by many 
experts and several politicians as a possible solution to Europe’s demographic 
challenges. These voices expect possible relief from the strains of demographic ageing 
on the national labour markets and welfare systems. Some even consider enhanced 
mobility within Europe and the inflow of qualified labour as a means for boosting 
economic development. 
 
Immigration can have, however, negative effects too. When immigrants have 
qualifications similar to those of natives, they might displace the latter on the labour 
markets and therefore indirectly contribute to unemployment. This is particularly true 
in the case of rigid labour markets, which are common in the EU. Further, if newly 
arriving immigrants pay less taxes than the equivalent of public goods they consume 
(i.e. infrastructure, education, etc.), the additional costs in the budgets have to be borne 
by natives and long-term immigrants. Moreover, in the case of generous welfare 
systems, immigrants might be attracted by the social benefits they could receive in the 
host country (so called “social tourism”). Therefore, immigration from third countries 
should not be deregulated completely. Pro-active recruitment of future migrants has to 
be a well managed process, assuring the best possible benefits for the receiving 
countries, the sending countries and the migrants. 
 
Since the European Union acquired competence in the area of migration under 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, immigration became a major issue on the European agenda. 
The Tampere European Council (1999) stressed the need “to develop common policies 
on asylum and immigration”. The Thessaloniki European Council (2003) further 
pointed-out to “the need to explore legal means for third country nationals to migrate to 
the Union, taking into account the reception capacities of the Member States […]”. And 
finally the Hague Programme, approved by the European Council in November 2004, 
stressed the importance of economic immigration for the implementation of the 
Lisbon strategy for “more and better jobs and sustainable growth” and appealed for an 
open debate at the EU level as a basis for “a policy plan on legal migration including 
                                                 
5 Admission of co-ethnic resettlers, family reunion, admission of asylum seekers and refugees. 
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admission procedures capable of responding promptly to fluctuating demands for 
migrant labour in the labour market”. The Commission’s response on this request was 
the Policy Plan on Legal Migration 6 from December 2005. 
 
The eventual coming into force of a new European constitution would further 
clarify the aim of a common EU immigration policy. The Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe’s states: “The Union shall develop a common immigration policy 
aimed at ensuring, at all stages the efficient management of migration flows [...]”.7
 
The scope of this policy paper is to identify how the EU and its Member States 
could use availability and skills of today’s and future immigrant populations in order to 
address economic and demographic challenges. To this end, it provides an analysis of 
the status quo and suggestions regarding future migration policies at both the 
Member States’ level and at the EU level. 
 
 
2. EU-27 demographic and immigration trends 
 
The overall demographic situation in the EU is characterized by low fertility (1.5 
children per woman8) and increasing life expectancy (75.1 years for men and 81.2 years 
for women9). In 2005, due to a still favourable age structure, today’s 27 EU Member 
States as a whole still had more births than deaths. The small surplus was of about 
300,000 persons (or 0.6‰ of the total population). Germany, Italy and all new EU 
Member States in Central and South-Eastern Europe (with the exception of Slovakia), 
however, reported more deaths than births. 
 
In 2005, the total population growth in the EU-27 exceeded 1.9 million people 
(3.9‰ of the total population). This, however, was mainly the result of a net gain from 
migration in the order of about +1.6 million people (or +3.3‰ of the total population; 
Table 1). Twenty of today’s 27 EU countries had a positive migration balance. The only 
exceptions were the Baltic States, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania. Net 
migration gains were highest in Cyprus (+27.2‰ of the total population), Spain 
(+15.0‰) and Ireland (+11.4‰). In countries like the Czech Republic, Italy and Slovenia 
net migration turned an excess of deaths over births into a positive total population 
change. 
 
In early 2006, the total population of today’s 27 EU Member States was 491 
million. The number of third country nationals living in the EU-27 is estimated to be 
14.4 million people, or 3.0% of its total population. At the same time some 8.5 million 
EU citizens (1.7%) were residing in another EU Member State. Because of high 
naturalization rates the total number of international migrants is significantly higher. 
The number of EU residents born in a country outside the EU-27 amounts to 27.3 
million people (5.6% of total population; Table 2).10 13.2 million EU residents (2.7%) 
were born in another EU country. 
 
                                                 
6 European Commission (2005a). 
7 Article III-267. 
8 Total fertility rate. 
9 Average life expectancy at birth in 2004; source: Eurostat. 
10 Source: OECD (2006), UN (2006) and European Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc modules (2005) and national 
statistics; own calculations (see Table 2). 
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Relative to the population size, the following EU Member States reported the 
highest shares of foreign-born residents: Luxembourg (37.4%), Latvia (19.5%), Estonia 
(15.2%), Austria (15.1%), Ireland (14.1%), Cyprus (13.9%), Sweden (12.4%) and Germany 
(12.3%). The shares of immigrants born in countries outside the EU-27 were highest in 
Latvia (17.6%), Estonia (14.4%), Austria (9.1%), Ireland (14.1%), Cyprus (8.6%), and the 
Netherlands (8.4%; Table 2). Among other Western European countries Liechtenstein 
(33.9%) and Switzerland (22.9%) had the highest shares of foreign-born residents.11
 
The largest group of immigrants living in the European Union are ethnic 
Germans who had come mainly from Kazakhstan, Russia, Poland and Romania to 
Germany. The largest group of third country nationals are Turkish citizens: around 2.4 
million in the EU-27, of whom 1.9 million in Germany.12
 
The key gates of entry for third country nationals entering the EU as permanent 
or temporary migrants are employment, family reunion, asylum and education. In 2001 
some 40% of all newly issued residence permits were granted in the EU-15 for 
employment and another 30% for family reunifications.13 However, we have to keep in 
mind that, first of all, these numbers do not account for seasonal and temporary labour 
migration, which is quite common in countries like Austria, Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain. And secondly, they do not include irregular immigration.14
 
The main reasons for admission of newly arriving migrants differ notably among 
the EU Member States. In some countries recent immigration is predominantly linked 
to family reunification, e.g. in Sweden (50% of all newly issued residence permits), 
France (40%), Denmark (36%) and Finland (33%). In contrast, employment was the 
reason for legal entry in 61% of the cases in Italy, 46% in Portugal, and 36% in Spain.15
 
Since the 1990s, irregular immigration has contributed significantly to the 
increase of the foreign-born population of countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. This has become obvious in the course of several regularisation campaigns. 
 
 
3. Migrants’ contribution to employment in Europe 
 
The size of Western and Central Europe’s labour force is 227 million. In the absence of 
immigration and at constant labour force participation rates this labour force would 
shrink to 201 million in 2025 and to 160 million in 2050. In order to maintain it 
constant over the analysed period a net inflow of 66 million labour migrants would be 
necessary.16 This would mean that on average a net inflow of slightly less than 1.5 
million labour migrants per year would be required to keep Europe’s economically 
active population at constant levels. However, since not all newcomers will join the 
work force, the total net migration would have to be higher. 
 
                                                 
11 Liechtenstein is member of the European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland is associated with the European Union 
on the basis of bilateral treaties. 
12 European Commission (2004a). 
13 Source: European Commission (2003). 
14 Münz (2007). 
15 See European Commission (2003). 
16 For more details see Münz et al. (2006). 
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Between 2000 and 2005 the number of people at working age (i.e. 15 to 64) 
employed in the 15 pre-enlargement Member States (EU-15) increased by about 8.2 
million.17 Of them about 34%18 were third country nationals and the remaining were 
citizens of the country of residence or citizens of another EU-15 Member State.19 The 
share of third country nationals in the total employment was 4% in 2005.20
 
It is, however, not surprising that third-country nationals contributed 
disproportionally to total employment growth, when taking into account that in the 
same period some 80% of the population increase in the EU was due to a positive net 
migration balance. Furthermore, during the past five years, third country nationals 
increased their employment rates in the EU-15 compared to natives. Whereas in 2000 
they lagged 14.8% points behind EU-nationals (11.1% points for males; 18.5% points for 
females), the employment gap decreased to 11.4% points in 2005 (7.6% points for 
males; 15.0% points for females). The employment rates of nationals of a country 
outside the EU-15 were 50.8% (62.6% for males; 38.9% for females) in 2000 and 55.6% 
(66.0% for males; 45.4% for females) in 2005 (Figure 1). 
 
The question now is how the increased employment of immigrants affected the 
employment levels of natives: Was there a displacement effect, with foreign-born 
crowding out natives from the labour market? Or did it generate an increase in the 
demand for labour resulting in higher employment levels of natives? 
 
 In the neoclassical economic theory, there is no effect on unemployment since 
perfect price flexibility and full employment of factors are assumed. Under more 
realistic assumptions, a common sense analysis is often based on the concept of “a 
lump of jobs”, i.e. a fixed number of jobs in the immigrant receiving country. If 
immigrants are employed then, by definition, some natives must lose their jobs (i.e. 
substitution effect). However, if productivity increases due to the more efficient 
allocation of labour, then the demand for resident labour increases. In this case, at 
aggregate level the total number of jobs created by the presence of immigrants offsets 
the displacement of natives, if favourable dynamic effects fully unfold. 
 
Still, we must realise that even in the neutral case, there is a so-called “churning 
effect”. This effect arises since native-born workers are displaced for a certain period of 
time and only the long-run demand effects compensate this initial job displacement. 
Furthermore, the native workers who lose their jobs, may not be employed later, as 
some of them have different skill levels than the ones required for the newly created 
jobs. Thus, the displaced workers will need to be retrained, which in turn generates 
costs to the treasury or to their household budget and/or additional demand for 
migrant labour. 
 
Positive effects are attained when natives and immigrants do not compete for 
job opportunities and are therefore complements on the labour market, not 
                                                 
17 The analysis of employment growth between 2000 and 2005 refers only to the EU-15, which is home to 97% of all 
third country nationals residing in the EU-27. 
18 The number could be significantly higher if taking into account that 21% of the LFS respondents did not declare 
their nationality. We can say that third country nationals contributed during the period of 2000-2005 between 27% 
and 48% of the creation of jobs. Source: European Labour Force Survey, Eurostat. 
19 Source: European Labour Force Survey, Eurostat; own calculations. 
20 In 2005 the share of third country nationals in EU-25 employment was 4.6%. 
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substitutes. This occurs, for example, when the immigrant workers provide 
complementary human (or financial capital) or take up jobs avoided by natives. 
 
During the 1990s empirical studies analysing the effects of labour migration on 
native employment pointed to small negative employment effects.21 A statistical 
analysis of the period 2000-2005, however, illustrates that in the EU-15 the 
employment rates of natives grew by 1.4% to reach 65%; during the same period the 
immigrants’ share in the total employment increased by over 40%. And we notice that 
the employment rates of natives showed the highest increase in countries with 
primarily economic immigration and less regulated labour markets: from 56.0% to 
62.5% in Spain, from 56.4% to 59.8% in Greece and from 64.7% to 67.0% in Ireland. 
 
There are several mechanisms through which immigrants contribute to job 
creation ranging from entrepreneurship, increasing domestic demand for goods and 
services, to improving the efficiency of labour markets. 
 
3.1 Immigration and labour market efficiency 
 
Many European studies show that immigration plays an important role in improving 
labour market efficiency. All sectors with jobs avoided by natives, e.g. dirty, difficult and 
dangerous jobs, low-paid household service jobs, low skilled jobs in the informal sector 
of the economy, jobs in sectors with strong seasonal fluctuations, e.g. farming, road 
repairs and construction, hotel, restaurant and other tourism-related services, heavily 
depend on the labour supply of immigrants. In their absence, these sectors would 
probably face severe shortages of labour22 or labour costs would sharply increase. 
 
The need for immigrants to meet shortages in sectors with predominantly low 
skilled jobs is, however, a controversial and debated issue. The opponents of rather 
liberal policy approaches are criticising the recruitment of foreign labour in periods of 
high unemployment (which is nowadays the case in many EU Member States). They 
argue that the vacant low skilled jobs should be filled in larger numbers by native low 
skilled unemployed. 
 
For example, due to the high unemployment and rising associated costs, the 
German government decided to compel long-term unemployed to re-enter the labour 
market starting with September 2006 by cutting payments if they refuse to accept 
vacant jobs (even below their skills level). If such programmes are to be successfully 
implemented it is to be expected that more competition between immigrants and 
natives for low skilled jobs would occur. Still, resident citizens of other EU countries, 
third country nationals with a permanent residence status and recognised refugees will 
be in a comparative advantage due to the “community preference” principle. 
 
At the same time, the demand for the low skilled jobs is predicted to change 
over the next decades. Manual jobs in manufacturing and farming are expected to 
decrease. However, demographic ageing in the EU-27 could lead to the rising 
importance of household and care services. More low skilled service jobs are likely to be 
                                                 
21 See Angrist and Kugler (2003). 
22 See IOM (2005) and OECD (2003). 
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created. And this could lead to an additional demand that will not be met by the 
shrinking native population at working age.23
 
A second type of labour market inefficiency results from qualifications 
mismatches. Fast growing sectors, e.g. the IT, experience shortages that in the short-
term cannot be met by enhancing the efforts of the domestic education systems. Such 
bottlenecks are expected to increase as the EU economy will become, with the 
globalisation process, more and more a knowledge based one. On the one hand labour 
intensive industries (e.g. textile, manufacturing) are relocating production to world 
regions with lower labour costs, in particular to Asia. On the other hand there is a 
growing probability that jobs requiring high skills and specific professional competence 
will be further located in Europe and North America. Thus, the demand for high skilled 
labour in sectors like IT, engineering, consultancy and financial services is predicted to 
rise.24
 
The skills required for emerging jobs typically differ quite substantially from 
those of workers who were made redundant. The extent to which the latter are 
retrained and redeployed depends considerably on whether other workers are available 
who already have had such training. Reforms of the education systems of the EU 
Member States are undoubtedly needed to assure that the next generation will be 
provided with skills required by future labour markets. However, it will take 5 to 10 
years for the first effects to materialise, and desired effects are not guaranteed. 
Therefore, investing in higher education is not a solution for immediate and pressing 
shortages. The active recruitment of high skilled workers, however, is a short-term and 
efficient instrument for easing the qualification mismatch on the labour markets. 
 
Finally, labour shortages arise as a result of low mobility of the domestic labour 
force, as indicated by considerable differences in wages and unemployment rates. Italy 
may serve as an example: internal labour mobility is very low, despite the country’s 
large employment and income gaps between the North and the South. This is due to 
the coexistence of a high income per capita differential and a much lower consumption 
per capita differential between Southern and Northern Italy and thus leads to high cost 
of internal mobility. Foreign immigrants however, being income-maximising, move to 
the areas with high wages and low unemployment, and thus act as complements to 
the much less mobile natives. Therefore, the immigrants have not been found to 
negatively influence the transition of natives out of or into unemployment.25
 
Since immigrants are more mobile and more efficient in using employment 
opportunities, they have a higher potential to meet shortages due to the regional 
mismatch within and between EU Member States. Two measures could help 
establishing a better integrated EU labour market that enhance its flexibility and thus 
the competitiveness of the EU economy: (a) granting free mobility (i.e. labour market 
access in all EU Member States) to third country nationals who are long-term residents; 
(b) implementing common measures to admit economic immigrants to the EU. 
 
Empirical evidence from several EU countries shows that in most cases 
immigrants are complements to the natives in the labour market and thus have no 
                                                 
23 Boswell and Straubhaar (2005) 
24 Boswell and Straubhaar (2005). 
25 Venturini and Villosio (2004). 
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negative effects on the natives’ job prospects and wages. One exception is the 
construction sector. In many EU Member States the native work force employed in this 
sector is highly unionised. Construction workers are, for example, protected against 
wage competition from immigrants through collective wage agreements and dismissal 
protection, instruments that have the unintended consequence of attracting more 
immigrants than it would have been the case in their absence. These amplify, as a 
result, unemployment and/or wage depression pressures and create incentives for the 
expansion of irregular employment of both native and foreign-born labour.26
 
3.2 Labour market performance of immigrants: an unused potential 
 
In many EU Member States, employment rates of natives and immigrants born in 
another EU country have reached levels that cannot easily be increased any further. 
This is particularly true for medium and high skilled adults in the age groups 20-55 
years.27 As often noted by scholars and the European Commission,28 there still is, 
however, an unused employment potential among immigrants from medium and low-
income countries. 
 
The average employment rate of immigrants from countries outside the EU-27 
(across all skill levels) is 4.3% points lower than that of the natives (see Table 3). The 
largest employment gaps are reported in Poland (23.0% points), Finland (21.2% points), 
Denmark (20.1% points), Sweden (19.7% points) and Belgium (19.6% points). Labour 
market performance of non-naturalised immigrants (i.e. third country nationals) 
residing in the EU-27 is even worse. With an employment rate of 54.4% they lagged 
10.5% points behind citizens of the respective country of residence (and 10.6% points 
behind citizens of other EU-27 countries; Table 4). While employment rates for third 
country nationals increased during the period 2000-2005, unemployment rates 
remained stable at about 18%, being twice as high as those of EU-nationals. The largest 
differences in unemployment rates were registered in Belgium (26.7% points), Finland 
(20.0% points), Sweden (17.6% points), France (16.3% points) and the Netherlands 
(14.2% points; Table 6). 
 
One of the main reasons for the low employment and high unemployment rates 
of third country nationals is the fact that in most EU Member States asylum seekers 
and legal immigrants entering under the provision of family reunion are not easily 
granted access to domestic labour markets. This does not only generate additional 
costs for the public coffer but, from an economic point of view, also creates 
inefficiencies. First of all, asylum seekers and low skilled legal immigrants could take up 
jobs in sectors avoided by legal residents and thus fill gaps on the labour market. This 
would enable them to make their living and make them less dependent on social 
benefits. Secondly, those with particular qualifications are in danger of losing their 
acquired skills if remaining outside the formal labour market for a longer time. A 
possible de-qualification would consequently undermine their future job prospects. 
 
The importance of the access to work for the labour market performance of 
immigrants becomes apparent when looking at the employment and unemployment 
rates of third-country nationals in South European countries, Ireland, UK and also some 
                                                 
26 IOM (2005). 
27 European Commission (2004b). 
28 European Commission (2004a, 2004b and 2003), Münz (2007). 
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of the new EU Member States. These countries have more open labour markets and 
mainly economic immigration. Perhaps these were the main reasons why they 
registered reverse employment gaps (i.e. third-country nationals having higher 
employment rates than citizens of these host countries): Hungary (-11.1% points), 
Greece (-9.6% points), Malta (-9.3% points), Cyprus (-7.5% points), Spain (-6.9% points), 
Czech Republic (-6.2% points), and Portugal (-4.7% points; see Table 4). The above 
mentioned countries registered the lowest unemployment gaps as well: -0.7% points in 
the Czech Republic, -2.8% points in Ireland, -3.2% points in Spain, -5.0% points in the 
United Kingdom and -5.4% points in Portugal. In Cyprus, Greece and Malta, the 
unemployment rate of third country nationals was even 1.1 to 1.6% points lower than 
that of natives (see Table 6). 
 
Education plays an equally important role. For instance, in the case of the 
Netherlands, the immigrants’ low employment rates are highly related to their lower 
educational attainment. Only about 30% of them have higher secondary or tertiary 
education as compared to over 60% of Dutch natives. On average, educational 
attainment remains lower also for the younger generation of immigrants and their 
children (i.e. the so-called second and third generation). More than 60% of third country 
nationals aged 15-24 were low skilled and only 5% high skilled; compared with 46% 
and 8.5% respectively for EU-nationals.29
 
Gender as well as the cultural background seem to be important determinants 
of employment too. Migrant women from middle and low-income countries are more 
likely than men not to be involved in the labour market and spend most of their time at 
home. This makes it more difficult for them to acquire language skills and establish 
social networks necessary to integrate more easily into the receiving society. 
 
Some immigrant women (in particular Muslim women) are reluctant to enter 
the labour market for cultural or religious reasons. For example in 2005, immigrant 
women with the citizenship of Turkey or countries of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) had the lowest employment rates in the EU-25. Their employment rates only 
reached levels of 30.3% and 22.4% respectively (Figure 2). These rates represent only 
about half the level of national female employment and only one third of the 
comparable male employment levels. However, when also taking into account 
naturalised immigrants, the employment rates of Muslim women are much higher, 
reaching almost 40% in 2005,30 thus indicating a potentially positive effect of EU 
citizenship on integration. 
 
Moreover, labour market discrimination is likely to have an impact as well.31 
Most EU citizens acknowledge that members of immigrant minorities would have less 
chances of getting a job or traineeship, even with the same level of qualification as 
other candidates.32
 
A low labour market performance of immigrants proves to be also a burden for 
the receiving country’s budget. Empirical evidence suggests that the immigrants’ 
dependence on welfare payments is strongly correlated with their labour market 
                                                 
29 European Commission (2004a). 
30 See also European Commission (2004b). 
31 Roodenburg et al. (2003). 
32 European Commission (2004a). 
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performance. Countries in which immigrants performed better (e.g. Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and UK) experienced a positive contribution of immigrants to 
their treasury. However, in countries where immigrants encounter difficulties in 
accessing work, appropriate schooling and training and face discrimination (e.g. 
Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Sweden), immigrants are more 
dependent on welfare payments than natives. Germany partly also falls into the latter 
category because of the large-scale admission of ethnic Germans and their 




3.3 The importance of integration programmes 
 
In the Integrated Guidelines for Jobs and Growth the European Commission invited the 
Member States to take action to increase the employment of immigrants.33 As stressed 
in A Common Agenda for Integration, efforts undertaken by EU Member States to 
effectively integrate immigrants into the labour markets will constitute a major 
contribution to reach the Lisbon targets.34 Work, education and language skills are 
generally considered to be the most important avenues of inclusion. 
 
The lack of access to work was identified by the European Commission to be the 
greatest barrier to integration and thus the most important political priority within 
national integration policies.35 In Germany for example, until 2005, only EU citizens and 
foreigners with an unlimited residence permit – which was generally granted only after 
at least five years of legal residence in Germany or to recognised refugees – were given 
unrestricted access to the labour market.36 All others (about one third of the foreign 
resident population), including foreign-born spouses of German citizens, had no or only 
restricted access to the German labour market. And even when granted, it was initially 
subject to labour market testing and bureaucratic discretion. In practice work permits 
were issued for a particular job if neither Germans nor other EU citizens or privileged 
third country nationals were available and if no “negative effects” on the regional 
labour market could be expected.37
 
Additionally to assuring access to work, integration programmes need to target 
the improvement of the educational level of immigrants and their descendants38, give 
special attention to the social situation and inclusion of migrant women39 and be also 
cultural-sensitive. 
 
Further, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) underlines 
that social exclusion and marginalisation of migrants and their children is associated 
with particular risks and costs. The risk of disadvantaged and segregated migrant 
communities is that their members may retreat from society and look for other ways of 
                                                 
33 European Commission (2005f). 
34 European Commission (2005d). 
35 See European Commission (2004a). 
36 On January 1st 2005 a new immigration law entered into force in Germany and removed most of these legal 
obstacles, e.g. spouses do now immediately obtain the same labour market access as the principal migrant. 
37 Between 1997 and 2000, asylum seekers and so called “non deplorable aliens”, i.e. quasi-refugees, could not work 
in Germany, whatever their length of stay. See OECD (2005f). 
38 “CBP 5: Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more 
successful and more active participants in society.” (European Commission, 2005d) 
39 European Commission (2005d) and GCIM (2005). 
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expressing their frustration and asserting their identity. The 2005 riots in the 
peripheries of France’s major cities could be interpreted in this direction. Such 
incidences which represent a threat to public order may further provoke negative 
attitudes towards migrant communities and, as a consequence, place new obstacles in 
the way of integration and social cohesion. 
 
In the past years, important steps have been undertaken to improve the 
integration of third country nationals into the Member States’ labour markets and 
societies. A legal framework was created, prescribing the equality of treatment and 
granting the rights of access to employment and to education/training.40 National 
Contact Points (NCPs) on integration were established with the purpose of monitoring 
the progress across policy fields and ensuring that efforts at national and EU level are 
mutually reinforcing. In 2004, the first edition of a Handbook on Integration41 was 
drafted in close cooperation with the NCPs. 
 
The Handbook is addressing policy-makers and practitioners at the local, 
regional, national and EU level and focuses on three issues: (i) the introduction of 
programmes for newly arrived immigrants and recognised refugees, (ii) the 
participation in the civic and political life and (iii) the development of integration 
indicators. The second edition, to be released in May 2007, will focus on housing and 
urban issues, access to health and social services as well as the integration in the labour 
market.42
 
To sum up, the best immigration policies are those aiming at an increased 
flexibility of labour markets, promoting the integration in the receiving society and 
encouraging immigrants to participate in education and employment. 
 
 
4. Migrants’ contribution to economic growth 
 
According to neoclassical economic theory (assuming full employment), the amount of 
domestic income (GDP) generated by immigrant labour outweighs the costs associated 
with employing immigrants. The difference is called immigration surplus, representing 
the increase of the income of the natives.43 Moreover, when distinguishing between 
low skilled and high skilled labour, the immigration surplus is maximised when the 
immigrant labour is a complement to the native labour (because of the positive effect 
on productivity) and not a substitute. This would be the case when the skills 
composition of the immigrants differs from that of the native workers. Finally, when 
capital is taken into account as a production factor, then skilled immigrant labour 
generates a larger immigration surplus (as compared to unskilled immigrant labour) 
because of the production complementarities that exist between skilled labour and 
capital. This conclusion is reinforced, when considering the possibility that the human 
capital brought in by the skilled migrant labour increases productivity as well. 
 
In modern economics, however, human capital plays a dominant role in the 
determination of the long-term growth rate, and immigration is predicted to have 
                                                 
40 European Commission (2005d). 
41 Niessen and Schibel (2004). 
42 European Commission (2005d). 
43 For details see Münz et al. (2006), pp. 24-26. 
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either a positive or a negative effect on it. Depending on the ratio of skilled versus 
unskilled immigrants, the average human capital in the economy could be increased or 
reduced. If migrants have a higher average skills level than natives, the average human 
capital in the receiving economy would be increased, the accumulation of human 
capital improved, and this would cause a positive effect on long-tem growth. In 
contrast, immigration would have a negative effect on growth, when only low skilled 
workers enter the labour market of the receiving country. 
 
4.1 Skills and productivity 
 
The skills structure of the EU immigrant population is favourable in terms of high skills, 
however, less favourable regarding medium skills. While the high skilled ratio of the 
immigrant population born in a country outside the EU-27 is slightly higher than the 
one of the natives (25.8% vs. 24.3%), the medium-skilled ratio of the foreign-born is 
significantly lower (37.9% vs. 47.6%) and the low skilled rate significantly higher (36.3% 
vs. 28.1%; see Table 7). Immigrants’ skills are, however, not evenly distributed between 
the EU Member States. Some were more successful in attracting high skilled labour; for 
example Ireland (59.0%), Denmark (37.8%) and Estonia (37.0%). In the same time other 
countries were destinations of mainly low skilled migrants: Portugal (50.5%), Malta 
(50.4%), Belgium (48.3%), France (47.6%), Austria (45.6%), Greece (44.4%) and Spain 
(43.9%). 
 
Still, due to the fact that immigrants represent only a fraction of the EU Member 
States’ labour force, they hardly contributed to a change in the skills structure. The 
difference in the high skilled ratios of EU-27 natives (i.e. natives of the country of 
residence plus immigrants born in another EU-27 country) and of the total population 
(i.e. including immigrants born in a country outside the EU-27) are for all EU Member 
States between +1% and –1% (see Figure 3). The highest increase in the high skilled 
share is noted in Ireland (+0.85%) and the highest decrease in the Netherlands (-0.99%). 
A larger impact occurs in the low- and medium-skilled shares. Nevertheless, the change 
only exceeds 3% in just one case: Austria (+3.1% in the low skilled share, but only -2.5% 
in the medium-skilled share and –0.6% in the high skilled share). 
 
In a knowledge based economy skilled human capital is the most valuable factor 
of production. Empirical estimates assume that more than half of the GDP in OECD 
countries is derived from human capital. Productivity and competitiveness in an 
increasingly globalised economy are even more dependent on the right knowledge and 
skills. The importance of technology is obvious in the booming IT sector. Innovation is 
the driving force for productivity and growth in the highly competitive international 
markets, characterised by short product cycles. The importance of technology and 
innovation implies the need not just for a high skilled labour force. The labour force 
should have the capacity to adjust flexibly to the rapidly changing technology as well.44
 
Both at the EU and the Member States level awareness rose that the 
accumulation of human capital by means of international recruitment45 as well as 
                                                 
44 Boswell and Straubhaar (2005). 
45 “In order to tap the world’s human capital and mine its wealth of knowledge, the Commission will work towards a 
common framework for managing economic migration at EU level and proposes accelerated admission procedures 
for longer term stays of third country researchers and the facilitation of uniform short-stay visas.” (European 
Commission, 2005e) 
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education46 is crucial for the achievement of the Lisbon goals of “creating more and 
better jobs” and “sustainable growth”. Thus, immigration policies in many EU countries 
were reoriented in recent years to give preference to high skilled migrants. 
 
Germany for example started in August 2000 a programme (the so-called 
German Green Card) aiming to give the fast growing IT sector the opportunity to recruit 
IT professionals internationally, in order to ease the shortages it was facing. A limited 
work permit up to a period of five years was granted, provided that the foreign expert 
was offered a position by a German company. The success of the initiative remains 
disputed. The programme is assumed to have enabled SMEs in the IT sector to 
significantly improve their competitiveness vis-à-vis the market’s leading global 
players. However, the low numbers of IT Green Cards issued (17,111 in 5 years) could be 
interpreted as a sign that the programme has not fully met its goals.47
 
Nevertheless, the Green Card programme contributed to the further 
development of immigration legislation in Germany. In January 2005 a new 
Immigration Act entered into force which foresees to provide for certain categories of 
highly qualified immigrants permanent residence permits from the outset. Dependent 
family members of these high skilled migrants are also entitled to take up employment 
in Germany. 
 
However, high skilled migrants continue to have North America as main 
destination. In 2000, almost two thirds of the OECD’s tertiary-educated immigrant 
population lived in North America (mostly in the US). OECD countries in Europe had 
attracted only about a quarter of all highly skilled migrants residing in high-income 
countries.48 A study highlights the selectiveness of emigration from the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA): 54% of all MENA migrants with a university degree reside in 
the US and Canada, while 87% of the low and medium skilled MENA migrants reside in 
Europe.49 One reason might be the lower levels of gross domestic expenditure on 
research and development (R&D) in the EU.50 Another reason might be that the US’ and 
Canada’s permanent immigrants are immediately granted life-long residence permits 
and the prospect of naturalization within five years. In Europe most migrants from 
outside the EU-27 only acquire permanent status after five years of residence. 
 
There are several arguments in favour of a selective immigration policy. For the 
receiving countries not only the recruitment of human capital is essential; highly skilled 
immigrants also tend to integrate much easier. For the design of a future common EU 
immigration policy, one could learn from past successful immigration policies in 
Australia and Canada. These countries select a part of their migrants based on age, 
skills and language proficiency.51 The main targets should be to improve human capital 
accumulation and assure a fast integration of immigrants into the host society.  
 
                                                 
46 “Fostering human capital and lifelong learning is indeed one of the most important dimensions of the EU 
employment and cohesion policy. Therefore, EU programmes, such as the EES, ESF and the Life Long Learning 
Programme, support ongoing human capital development of this type.” (European Commission, 2006) 
47 Kolb (2005). 
48 Katseli et al. (2006). 
49 Fargues (2005). 
50 European Commission (2005e). 
51 Recently such policies were implemented in France and the UK. 
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As a strategy for attracting the best minds from around the world, the European 
Commission proposed in its Policy Plan for Legal Migration that “a common special 
procedure to quickly select and admit such immigrants, as well as attractive conditions 
to encourage them to choose Europe should be devised”52 and spending in education 
and R&D increased, including the establishment of a European Institute of 
Technology.53
 
Another aspect of the failure of EU Member States to draw high skilled 
immigrants so far is at the level of first stage information provided to prospective 
migrants. The EU and its Member States, because of their continued efforts to 
implement restrictive immigration policies, are still perceived as a “fortress with closed 
gates” and immigration policy changes are still inappropriately disseminated. Better 
information for the prospective high skilled migrants around the world about the 
conditions and rights granted in the European labour market will be crucial in the short 
term for creating a momentum for a brain inflow and circulation to the European 
Union.  
 
It is, however, important to note, that not all human capital accumulated in the 
country of origin can be transferred offhand to a destination country. In Europe it was 
observed, that highly skilled immigrants are often employed in low skilled jobs, e.g. as 
taxi drivers or hospital staff. This so called brain waste generates resource costs and 
leaves room for questions about assimilation, integration and the consequences of 
discrimination for human capital accumulation in the receiving economy.  
 
An OECD study on Belgium remarks a considerable lack of integration. Initially 
poor labour market characteristics of quite large groups of immigrants and their 
descendants do not converge over time with the average for Belgian citizens. This 
appears to be caused by a combination of labour market rigidity, the reciprocal link 
between a low labour market status and a relatively poor school performance, and to 
some extent also due to labour market discrimination against non-European 
immigrants. Discrimination not only hinders the labour market performance of 
immigrants, but by decreasing returns to human capital lowers their incentive to invest 
in host-country-specific human capital, which further weakens their labour market 
performance.54
 
The conditions of work and stay granted to high skilled workers should take into 
consideration and support potential activities of migrants that have a developmental 
impact on countries of origin; for example: migrants’ remittances, circular migration, 
trans-national business and Diaspora activities.  
 
Two issues are of a particular importance: first, there is the economic potential 
of the migrants that, as we discussed in the previous section, is mainly dependent on 
access to work, recognition of diplomas and the integration in the host society; and 
second, the possibility to work and act trans-nationally, by moving back and forth 
between the source and the receiving country. As shown in a recent study on Diaspora 
activities in Germany, major obstacles therefor are the deficiency in portability of 
                                                 
52 European Commission (2005a). 
53 European Commission (2005e). 
54 OECD (2005a). 
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rights, a resident status that limits the period of stay abroad55 and the lost of the 
source country’s citizenship.56
 
4.2 International students: future high skilled and integrated immigrants 
 
In recent years OECD countries recorded a considerable increase in the number of 
internationally mobile students enrolled in tertiary education. Between 1998 and 2003 
their number grew by about 45%, much of the increase occurring after 2001. Their total 
number was of 2 million in 2003, with the United States having the lion’s share (about 
600,000). However, European OECD countries attracted large numbers of students as 
well: France, in 2003, registered 221,600 foreign students, Germany 240,600 and the 
United Kingdom 255,200.57
 
Many EU Member States have introduced special provisions allowing foreign 
students to stay on to work or search for work after the completion of their studies, 
especially in areas with labour shortages. Germany’s new Immigration Act (January 
2005) entitles foreign graduates to remain in the country for up to one year after 
successfully completing their studies for the purpose of seeking employment. With 
more shortages expected in the coming years, in particular in the science, IT, 
engineering, and business consultancy sectors, it is likely that these practices will 
continue and expand. 
 
The extended period of residence, and often (part-time) work, combined with 
studying in the host country, is usually a guarantee for a smooth transition into the 
labour market, without the problems of non-recognition of qualifications or working 
experience that some immigrants encounter.58 Language proficiency and frequent 
contacts with natives during the years of study significantly enhance the successful 
integration into the host country’s society as well. Therefore, students should be 
granted more attractive conditions to stay and work in the EU after having successfully 





In recent years the European Union and its Member States took important steps in 
establishing a legal framework for managing immigration flows. Two Directives were 
adopted for the admission of researchers59 and students60 originating from third 
countries. The European Commission’s Policy Plan on Legal Migration published in 
December 2005 further proposed four Directives for the management of entry and 
residence of highly skilled workers, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees, and 
remunerated trainees respectively. With the Communication on A Common Agenda for 
Integration, the Commission also puts forward a framework for the integration of third 
                                                 
55 “The Directive on the status of long-term residents already offers interesting possibilities, such as the possibility 
for Member States to allow returning migrants to retain this status for longer than the one year period provided for 
in Art. 9.” (European Commission, 2005a) 
56 Bommes et al. (2006). 
57 Source: OECD (2006); these numbers include foreign students originating from other EU-25 countries as well as 
students from third countries. 
58 OECD (2006). 
59 European Council Directive 2005/71/EC. 
60 European Council Directive 2004/114/EC. 
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country nationals in the EU. A Directive was adopted as well, concerning the status of 
third country nationals who are long-term residents.61
 
Finally, the European Commission’s Communication on Migration and 
Development62 highlighted the importance to enhance collaboration with migrant 
sending countries on economic migration and to develop initiatives offering win-win-
win opportunities to countries of origin and destination and to labour migrants. 
Concrete suggestions were given regarding migrants’ remittances, collaboration with 
Diasporas, circular migration, and mitigation of the effect of brain drain. 
 
However, in order to make convincing recommendations for a common EU 
immigration policy, we have to ask ourselves: Why have earlier attempts to regulate EU 
immigration flows and integration into labour markets and society failed?  
 
We believe that the main weaknesses of former policies were: too many, too 
specific and too much top-down regulations. All this had the consequence of creating 
new bureaucracy, new rigidities and new inflexibilities. 
 
Less politics, with easy, transparent regulations and few selection criteria would 
thus represent the best policies. The common EU immigration policy should be flexible 
and adaptive to the fast changing realities in a globalising world.63
 
Mobility 
Three measures could help establishing a better integrated EU labour market that 
enhances flexibility and competitiveness: 
• Improving mobility of EU citizens; 
• Improving free mobility and labour market access for third country nationals 
who are long-term residents (i.e. have permanent residence or refugee status); 
• Implementing common measures to admit economic immigrants in order to 
make the EU a more attractive area of immigration; 
 
Admission 
• A permanent EU residence and work permit from the outset should be granted 
to high skilled immigrants and their family members; 
• Flexible procedures for admission of low and medium skilled workers: e.g. 
“probationary” periods (2 years) during which they might prove their ability to 
remain attached to the labour market and learn the national language, with the 
possibility to qualify for permanent residence;64 
 
Information 
• Improved information for prospective qualified migrants about conditions and 
rights granted in the EU Member States; 
• This will be crucial in the short term for creating a momentum for brain inflow 
to the European Union and brain circulation within the European Union as well 
as between EU-27 and sending countries outside the EU-27; 
 
                                                 
61 European Council Directive 2003/109/EC. 
62 European Commission (2005c). 
 See also Papademetriou and Meissner (2006). 63
64 Papademetriou and Meissner (2006). 
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Retention 
• Third country nationals enrolled in tertiary education should be entitled to 
remain for up to one year with the prospect of seeking employment (on the 
whole EU labour market); 
 
Inclusion 
• Gender- and cultural-sensitive integration programmes with special attention 
to the social situation and inclusion of migrant women; 
• Specific efforts to promote the educational performance of second and third 
generation immigrants; 
 
Development of skills in the countries of origin 
• European institutes of secondary and higher education should be encouraged 
and supported to expand collaborations with institutes in the migrant sending 
countries and/or set up offshore campuses in these countries; 
 
Reshaping the understanding of the issue 
Provision of factual information to the public is needed on:  
• Implications of future demographic change; 
• The ways in which both high skilled and low skilled immigrant labour 
contributes to employment and growth; 
•  The ways in which immigrant labour helps ease shortages on the labour 





Shortages on the EU labour markets are projected to occur and increase over the next 
decades. One set of reasons are preference, qualifications and regional mismatch of 
labour demand and supply. Other reasons are the prevailing demographic trends in the 
EU as well as the economic specialisation in the globalisation process. In order to ease 
such bottlenecks, increased immigration flows of both high- and low skilled workers 
have to be managed. 
 
Sectors suffering from labour shortages – e.g. household services, farming, road 
repairs, constructions, hotel, restaurant and tourism-related services, IT, consultancy 
and financial services – are made competitive, and helped to grow by immigrant 
labour. Immigration, thus, can contribute substantially to economic growth and job 
creation. 
 
Still, in Europe the economic potential of immigrant labour is not fully utilized. 
For example, there is evidence that immigrants are more mobile and flexible in using 
better employment opportunities and thus, have a higher potential to mitigate 
inefficiencies due to the regional disparities within the EU-27. However, they are not 
allowed to freely move between national labour markets of the EU Member States. 
Granting access to the national labour markets and subsequently also free mobility to 
third country nationals residing in the EU Member States could help establish a better 
integrated and more flexible EU labour market and thus increase the competitiveness 
of the EU economy. 
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In many EU countries immigrants face impediments with respect to the access 
to labour. The main are: labour market rigidities, incomplete recognition of acquired 
degrees and skills by the receiving societies, and last but not least discrimination. This 
clearly indicates that admission and integration policies are inseparable. Since the EU 
acquired competence in the area of migration very important steps have been 
undertaken to establish a legal framework and ambitious programmes for the 
successful integration of third country nationals. The efforts on the local, regional, 
national and EU level to translate commitments into action will be decisive for the role 
immigrants will play in the social and economic development of the European Union. 
 
Immigration contributes to long-term growth by enhancing the human capital 
of the receiving economy and thus innovation, productivity and its competitiveness on 
the international markets. Both at the EU and Member States levels awareness rose 
that the accumulation of human capital by means of both international recruitment 
and education are crucial for the achievement of the Lisbon targets of “creating more 
and better jobs” and “sustainable growth”. Thus, immigration policies in many EU 
countries were reoriented in recent years in order to give preference to high skilled 
migrants. 
 
However, the EU lags significantly behind North America as destination for high 
skilled migrants. This is true even for those originating in the neighbouring regions – 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. In order to make the EU a more 
attractive place to work and live for high skilled migrants, the EU and its Member 
States will have to grant them more generous conditions, for example access to the 
whole EU labour market and a permanent residence permit from the outset for them 
and the accompanying family. 
 
Special consideration should be given to encouraging third country students and 
graduates to stay and work in the EU after successfully completing their studies in one 
of the Member States. The language proficiency achieved and frequent contacts with 
the natives during the years of study enhance their successful integration into the host 
country’s society. Moreover, the extended period of residence and often (part-time) 
work during the study in the host country, is often a guarantee for a smooth transition 
into the labour market, without the problems of non-recognition of qualifications or 
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  in 1,000 per 1,000 population in 1,000 
EU-27 488,910 10.5 9.9 0.6 3.3 3.9 490,816
Austria 8,207 9.4 9.0 0.4 7.4 7.8 8,270
Belgium 10,446 11.4 10.0 1.4 3.2 4.6 10,494
Bulgaria 7,761 9.0 14.6 -5.6 -1.8 -7.4 7,704
Cyprus (i) 749 10.9 6.7 4.1 27.2 31.3 773
Czech Rep. 10,221 10.0 10.5 -0.5 3.5 2.9 10,251
Denmark 5,411 11.8 10.3 1.6 1.4 3.0 5,428
Estonia 1,347 10.6 13.1 -2.5 -0.3 -2.8 1,343
Finland 5,237 11.0 9.2 1.8 1.7 3.5 5,255
France 60,561 12.6 8.8 3.7 1.7 5.4 60,892
Germany 82,501 8.4 10.1 -1.7 1.2 -0.5 82,456
Greece 11,076 9.4 9.2 0.2 3.1 3.3 11,112
Hungary 10,098 9.6 13.5 -3.9 1.8 -2.1 10,076
Ireland 4,109 15.3 6.5 8.8 11.4 20.2 4,193
Italy 58,462 9.9 10.4 -0.5 5.8 5.3 58,772
Latvia 2,306 9.3 14.2 -4.9 -0.5 -5.4 2,294
Lithuania 3,425 8.9 12.9 -4.0 -3.0 -7.0 3,401
Luxemburg 455 11.5 7.6 3.9 3.4 7.3 458
Malta 403 9.9 7.2 2.7 5.0 7.8 406
Netherlands 16,306 11.6 8.4 3.1 -1.2 2.0 16,338
Poland 38,174 9.4 9.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 38,148
Portugal 10,529 10.5 9.7 0.8 3.9 4.7 10,579
Romania 21,659 10.2 12.3 -2.1 -0.5 -2.5 21,604
Slovakia 5,385 10.0 9.8 0.2 0.8 0.9 5,390
Slovenia 1,998 8.8 9.2 -0.5 3.6 3.1 2,004
Spain 43,038 10.9 8.8 2.1 15.0 17.1 43,781
Sweden 9,011 10.4 9.9 0.5 2.7 3.2 9,040
UK 60,035 11.9 9.9 2.0 3.3 5.3 60,354
Candidate Countries   
Croatia  4,444 9.4 11.1 -1.7 2.6 0.9 4,448
Macedonia 2,030 : : : : 0.2 2,034
Turkey 71,610 18.9 6.2 12.7 0.0 12.7 72,520
Other EEA and Switzerland
Iceland 294 14.2 6.2 7.9 2.0 10.0 297
Liechtenstein 35 10.8 6.4 4.5 3.8 8.3 35
Norway 4,606 12.4 8.8 3.7 4.7 8.4 4,645
Switzerland 7,415 9.6 8.3 1.3 4.7 6.0 7,460
Notes:  
(i) Greek part of Cyprus only. 
Source: EUROSTAT, Chronos Database; for Macedonia: World Development Indicators 2006; Münz et al. (2006). 
 
Table 2: Foreign-nationals and foreign-born population in EU-27 (latest available year) 
 Foreign-nationals(i) Foreign-born(i)
 Total 
Citizen of an other 
EU-27 country 
Citizen of a country 
outside the EU-27 Total 
Born in an other 
EU-27 country 
Born in a country outside 
the EU-27 
 in 1,000 % in 1,000 % in 1,000 % in 1,000 % in 1,000 % in 1,000 % 
EU-27 22,888 4.7 8,462(ii) 1.7(ii) 14,426(ii) 3.0(ii) 40,560 8.3 13,222(iii) 2.7(iii) 27,279(iii) 5.6(iii)
Austria 777 9.5 272 3.3 505 6.2 1,234 15.1 489 6.0 745 9.1 
Belgium 871 8.4 618 6.0 253 2.4 1,186 11.4 611 5.9 575 5.5 
Bulgaria 26 0.3 : : : : 104 1.3 : : : : 
Cyprus(iv) 65 9.4 35 5.1 30 4.3 116 13.9 44 5.3 72 8.6 
Czech Republic 254 2.5 126 1.2 128 1.3 453 4.4 344 3.3 109 1.1 
Denmark 268 4.9 91 1.7 177 3.2 389 7.2 116 2.2 273 5.0 
Estonia 95 6.9 (3) (0.2) 92 6.7 202 15.2 (10) (0.8) 192 14.4 
Finland 108 2.1 46 0.9 62 1.2 156 3.0 63 1.2 93 1.8 
France 3,263 5.6 1,278 2.2 1,985 3.4 6,471 10.7 2,125 3.5 4,346 7.2 
Germany 6,739 8.9 2,385 3.1 4,354 5.8 10,144 12.3 : : : : 
Greece 762 7.0 163 1.5 599 5.5 974 8.8 214 1.9 760 6.9 
Hungary 142 1.4 92 0.9 50 0.5 316 3.1 200 2.0 116 1.1 
Ireland 223 5.5 152 3.7 71 1.8 585 14.1 429 10.3 156 3.8 
Italy 2,402 4.1 : : : : 2,519 4.3 : : : : 
Latvia 103 3.9 (10) (0.4) 93 3.5 449 19.5 43 1.9 406 17.6 
Lithuania 21 0.6 (5) (0.1) 16 0.5 165 4.8 11 0.3 154 4.5 
Luxemburg 177 39.0 : : : : 174 37.4 : : : : 
Malta 13 3.2 6 1.5 7 1.7 11 2.7 4 1.0 7 1.7 
Netherlands 699 4.3 261 1.6 438 2.7 1,736 10.6 354 2.2 1,382 8.4 
Poland 49 0.1 (12) (0.03) 37 0.1 703 1.8 241 0.6 462 1.2 
Portugal 449 4.3 90 0.9 359 3.4 764 7.3 178 1.7 586 5.6 
Romania 26 0.1 : : : : 103 0.6 : : : : 
Slovakia 22 0.4 (12) (0.2) (10) (0.2) 124 2.3 106 2.0 18 0.3 
Slovenia 37 1.9 (4) (0.2) (33) (1.7) 167 8.5 14 0.7 153 7.8 
Spain 1,977 4.6 594 1.4 1,383 3.2 4,790 11.1 1,405 3.3 3,385 7.8 
Sweden 463 5.1 205 2.3 258 2.8 1,117 12.4 558 6.2 559 6.2 
United Kingdom 2,857 2.9 1,131 1.1 1,726 1.8 5,408 9.1 1,592 2.7 3,816 6.4 
 24 
25 
Notes: (i) Data on the total foreign-national and foreign-born populations are from OECD (2006), UN (2006) and national statistics. The totals are split between “other EU-27” and “outside EU-27” on the basis 
of estimations computed with data from the European Labour Force Survey (2005). (ii) For the estimation of the EU-27 total we assume that the foreign-nationals in Bulgaria, Italy, Luxembourg and Romania 
(for which there are no data available in the LFS) are distributed among “other EU-27” and “outside EU-27” in the same way as the average of the remaining EU-27 countries. (iii) For the estimation of the EU-
27 total we assume that the foreign-born in Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Romania (for which there are no data available in the LFS) are distributed among “other EU-27” and “outside EU-27” in 
the same way as the average of the remaining EU-27 countries. (iv) Greek part of Cyprus only.  
Source: OECD (2006), UN (2006), European Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc modules (2005), and national statistics.
Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size. 
 
Figure 1: Employment rates in EU-15(i) of population aged 15 to 64 by nationality and 










2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005
Total Males Females
Citizen of country of
residence
Citizen of an other EU-
15 country
Citizen of a country
outside the EU-15 (ii)
 
Notes: (i) Incomplete EU-15 average: employment rates (2005) do not include data for Italy; employment rates 
(2000) do not include data for France and Italy. (ii) Including all countries that became EU Member States in 2004 
and 2007. 
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS), 2005; Eurostat. 
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Table 3: Employment rates of population aged 15 to 64 by place of birth and gender, 
2005 (in percent)  
 
 
Born in country  
of residence 
Born in an other  
EU-27 country 
Born in a country  
outside EU-27 
 Total Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females 
EU-27(i) 64.5 71.2 57.7 66.8 74.4 60.2 60.3 69.8 51.2
Austria 68.8 74.5 63.0 66.6 71.3 63.1 58.8 66.2 51.5
Belgium 62.8 68.7 56.7 56.9 67.6 47.2 43.2 55.6 31.2
Cyprus 68.4 80.1 56.8 61.8 73.8 52.2 74.4 76.9 72.8
Czech Republic 64.7 73.3 56.1 59.1 64.6 53.1 68.8 88.1 46.4
Denmark 76.8 80.8 72.6 67.7 71.8 64.0 56.6 68.0 48.4
Estonia 64.4 65.4 63.4 60.7 : : 68.7 73.6 64.8
Finland 69.6 71.2 68.0 64.4 70.9 58.0 48.4 53.9 43.6
France 63.6 68.6 58.6 65.5 73.7 58.6 53.6 63.4 44.1
Germany 67.0 72.2 61.8 : : : : : :
Greece 59.8 73.8 45.9 62.8 77.3 53.6 66.6 83.8 47.8
Hungary 56.7 62.8 50.9 62.2 73.9 52.6 63.2 70.9 56.5
Ireland 67.0 75.8 58.0 71.6 81.8 60.6 61.0 71.0 50.2
Italy 57.3 69.4 45.3 : : : : : :
Latvia 62.3 65.6 59.3 62.4 (66.3) (58.4) 69.1 79.3 60.4
Lithuania 62.4 65.8 59.1 : : : 73.0 82.7 64.5
Malta 53.5 73.6 33.3 45.2 72.7 26.0 61.6 73.1 48.2
Netherlands 75.1 81.6 68.5 69.1 76.4 63.5 58.6 67.4 49.6
Poland 52.4 58.3 46.6 (26.1) (25.2) (27.1) 29.4 (36.5) (22.5)
Portugal 67.2 73.1 61.4 66.0 74.4 58.1 74.8 79.8 70.4
Slovakia 57.5 64.1 50.9 48.4 62.6 36.8 (70.2) : :
Slovenia 65.9 69.8 61.8 (59.2) (69.9) (51.1) 68.2 75.5 61.0
Spain 62.3 74.4 50.0 70.2 79.6 61.4 69.6 79.5 60.0
Sweden 74.6 76.3 72.9 72.9 75.3 70.7 54.9 58.4 51.4
United Kingdom 72.4 77.9 67.0 70.7 76.6 65.7 61.4 71.0 52.4
Notes: (i) Incomplete EU-27 average: employment rates of natives do not include data for Bulgaria, Luxemburg, and 
Romania; employment rates of immigrants (born in an other EU-27 country or outside the EU-27) do not include 
data for Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Romania.  
Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size. 
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc modules, Eurostat; own calculations. 
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Table 4: Employment rates of population aged 15 to 64 by nationality and gender, 
2005 (in percent)  
 
 
Citizen of the country  
of residence 
Citizen of an other  
EU-27 country 
Citizen of a country  
outside EU-27 
 Total Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females 
EU-27(i) 64.9 71.4 58.4 67.0 75.1 59.0 54.4 64.8 43.7
Austria 68.3 74.1 62.5 70.5 76.3 65.9 57.1 64.6 49.2
Belgium 61.9 68.3 55.4 59.8 68.3 50.4 34.0 48.0 19.5
Cyprus 68.3 80.1 56.8 66.8 75.0 58.2 75.8 74.3 76.6
Czech Republic 64.6 73.2 56.0 74.0 84.7 62.2 70.8 88.3 49.7
Denmark 76.3 80.5 72.0 67.3 78.2 57.1 50.1 61.5 42.2
Estonia 65.7 66.3 65.2 : : : 61.8 67.3 56.4
Finland 69.5 71.1 67.8 61.3 70.9 51.7 45.1 52.9 38.6
France 63.5 68.6 58.5 66.3 75.1 57.9 44.3 58.6 29.4
Germany 66.7 72.1 61.2 64.2 73.0 54.8 47.7 58.5 36.3
Greece 59.8 73.8 46.0 62.5 78.6 52.3 69.4 86.6 49.2
Hungary 56.7 62.9 50.9 65.2 76.4 56.1 67.8 76.1 59.5
Ireland 67.0 75.9 58.1 73.5 83.1 61.7 58.9 70.0 46.8
Latvia 63.1 66.9 59.5 : : : (64.3) : :
Lithuania 62.6 66.2 59.2 : : : 72.8 87.5 :
Malta 53.6 73.6 33.4 40.1 68.2 25.4 62.9 73.0 52.7
Netherlands 74.1 80.7 67.5 75.2 82.3 68.1 41.2 53.8 28.7
Poland 52.2 58.2 46.4 : : : (44.4) (64.3) (31.4)
Portugal 67.5 73.3 61.8 69.0 76.3 (59.5) 72.2 78.7 66.1
Slovakia 57.4 64.1 50.8 : : : : : :
Slovenia 66.0 70.2 61.8 : : : (54.5) (76.9) :
Spain 62.5 74.5 50.2 70.8 79.0 62.9 69.4 78.8 60.1
Sweden 73.5 75.3 71.6 71.9 75.0 68.9 44.7 49.2 40.6
United Kingdom 72.1 77.8 66.5 70.2 76.4 64.9 57.7 65.8 50.1
Notes: (i) Incomplete EU-27 average: employment rates do not include data for Bulgaria, Italy, Luxemburg and 
Romania.  
Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size. 
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc modules, Eurostat; own calculations. 
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Table 5: Unemployment rates of population aged 15 to 64 by place of birth and gender, 
2005 (in percent)  
 
 
Born in country of  
residence 
Born in an other  
EU-27 country 
Born in a country  
outside EU-27 
 Total Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females 
EU-27(i) 8.5 7.9 9.3 7.6 6.8 8.4 12.9 11.9 14.2
Austria 4.3 4.1 4.4 6.2 6.3 6.0 13.3 14.0 12.3
Belgium 6.9 6.3 7.5 8.6 5.0 12.8 25.2 23.0 28.8
Cyprus 5.5 4.4 7.0 (7.1) : (9.9) 4.6 (5.4) (4.0)
Czech Republic 7.7 6.2 9.7 14.6 14.2 15.2 9.1 : 21.6
Denmark 4.5 4.0 5.0 : : : 12.2 (9.1) 15.1
Estonia 8.0 10.0 6.0 : : : (10.3) : :
Finland 9.3 9.3 9.4 15.5 : (17.8) 28.8 30.4 26.9
France 8.6 8.1 9.2 6.7 5.8 7.7 18.1 16.2 20.6
Germany 10.4 10.6 10.1 : : : : : :
Greece 9.7 5.9 15.2 10.9 (7.9) 13.4 10.1 6.1 16.8
Hungary 7.2 7.0 7.4 : : : : : :
Ireland 4.1 4.5 3.5 5.7 5.6 (5.9) (6.9) : :
Italy 7.4 6.2 9.2 : : : : : :
Latvia 9.3 10.1 8.5 : : : 7.4 : (10.8)
Lithuania 8.5 8.6 8.3 : : : 11.1 : :
Malta 7.6 7.0 8.8 18.0 11.1 28.8 11.1 11.3 10.7
Netherlands 4.0 3.6 4.5 5.8 (6.2) (5.4) 12.2 13.1 10.9
Poland 18.3 17.4 19.4 : : (15.8) : :
Portugal 7.5 6.8 8.4 (9.6) : : 8.9 (9.0) (8.8)
Slovakia 16.3 15.7 17.0 29.1 (26.1) (33.0) : : :
Slovenia 5.7 5.7 5.8 : : : (7.5) (4.3) (11.2)
Spain 9.1 7.0 12.0 9.8 7.8 12.0 11.9 10.1 14.1
Sweden 7.9 7.8 7.9 7.0 8.1 6.0 20.2 20.8 19.5
United Kingdom 4.3 4.7 3.7 5.9 6.5 5.3 7.9 7.8 7.9
Notes: (i) Incomplete EU-27 average: unemployment rates of natives do not include data for Bulgaria, Luxembourg, 
and Romania; unemployment rates of immigrants (born in an other EU-27 country or outside the EU-27) do not 
include data for Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Romania.  
Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size. 
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc modules, Eurostat; own calculations. 
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Table 6: Unemployment rates of population aged 15 to 64 by nationality and gender, 
2005 (in percent)  
 
 
Citizen of the country of 
residence 
Citizen of an other  
EU-27 country 
Citizen of a country  
outside EU-27 
 Total Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females 
EU-27(i) 9.0 8.5 9.6 9.9 9.6 10.4 17.7 17.3 18.3
Austria 4.5 4.4 4.7 6.5 6.4 6.6 14.7 15.5 13.5
Belgium 7.4 6.6 8.3 9.6 7.1 13.1 34.1 32.9 36.8
Cyprus 5.5 4.3 7.0 7.0 (6.5) (7.8) (4.1) : (3.8)
Czech Republic 7.9 6.3 9.8 5.1 : : 8.5 : 20.0
Denmark 4.7 4.1 5.3 : : : 13.9 : (18.2)
Estonia 6.6 8.6 4.7 : : : 15.3 (15.3) (15.4)
Finland 9.5 9.4 9.5 (16.8) : : 29.4 (30.8) (27.8)
France 8.8 8.3 9.4 7.1 5.9 8.6 25.1 20.8 32.7
Germany 10.5 10.7 10.3 14.1 14.2 13.9 23.7 24.3 22.6
Greece 9.9 6.0 15.4 7.4 : (10.9) 8.3 4.5 15.2
Hungary 7.2 7.0 7.4 : : : : : :
Ireland 4.1 4.5 3.6 6.0 (6.1) : (6.9) : :
Latvia 9.1 9.5 8.7 : : : : : :
Lithuania 8.6 8.7 8.5 : : : : : :
Malta 7.8 7.2 9.0 22.1 17.2 28.1 6.6 5.3 8.5
Netherlands 4.5 4.2 4.9 (4.5) : : 18.7 19.8 (16.6)
Poland 18.3 17.4 19.4 : : : : : :
Portugal 7.5 6.8 8.3 : : : 12.9 (11.2) (14.8)
Slovakia 16.4 15.7 17.1 : : : : : :
Slovenia 5.9 5.6 6.3 : : : : : :
Spain 9.1 7.0 12.1 9.8 8.2 11.7 12.3 10.8 14.2
Sweden 8.4 8.4 8.4 7.5 8.6 6.2 26.0 28.4 23.1
United Kingdom 4.3 4.8 3.8 7.4 7.6 7.1 9.3 9.7 8.9
Notes: (i) Incomplete EU-27 average: unemployment rates do not include data for Bulgaria, Italy, Luxemburg and 
Romania.  
Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size. 
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc modules, Eurostat; own calculations. 
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Figure 2: Employment rates and unemployment rates of population aged 15 to 64 by 
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Notes: Incomplete EU-27 average: employment and unemployment rates do not include data for Bulgaria, Italy, 
Luxemburg and Romania. 








Born in country of  
residence 
Born in an other  
EU-27 country 
Born in a country  
outside EU-27 
 Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
EU-27(i) 28.1 47.6 24.3 30.7 41.0 28.3 36.3 37.9 25.8
Austria 16.5 65.8 17.7 14.0 57.7 28.3 45.6 41.5 12.9
Belgium 32.7 36.2 31.1 41.8 26.5 31.7 48.3 25.4 26.3
Cyprus 33.9 40.2 26.0 25.1 31.8 43.1 38.1 29.5 32.4
Czech Republic 9.9 77.2 13.0 23.6 62.2 14.3 15.9 54.2 29.9
Denmark 17.0 50.5 32.4 (10.6) 42.2 47.2 26.4 35.7 37.8
Estonia 11.0 56.2 32.8 : : : 10.5 52.5 37.0
Finland 20.8 44.6 34.6 20.5 47.0 32.5 28.3 44.8 26.9
France 31.3 43.5 25.2 51.0 28.7 20.3 47.6 27.9 24.5
Germany 12.4 62.2 25.4 : : : : : :
Greece 40.4 38.9 20.8 25.3 51.3 23.4 44.4 40.5 15.0
Hungary 24.1 59.0 16.8 16.4 60.8 22.8 11.0 57.9 31.1
Ireland 37.0 35.9 27.2 25.5 35.5 39.0 13.1 27.9 59.0
Italy 50.0 38.1 11.9 : : : : : :
Latvia 16.7 62.4 20.9 (33.7) 43.6 : 12.1 62.6 25.3
Lithuania 13.1 60.5 26.5 : : : 7.7 65.3 27.0
Malta 74.7 13.7 11.5 68.2 10.9 20.9 50.4 26.1 23.5
Netherlands 28.0 40.8 31.2 14.9 51.2 33.9 33.8 44.1 22.1
Poland 15.3 68.2 16.5 38.7 47.4 (13.9) (19.9) 58.1 22.0
Portugal 75.7 12.5 11.8 45.3 27.9 26.8 50.5 25.9 23.6
Slovakia 12.3 73.9 13.8 (15.5) 63.9 20.6 : : :
Slovenia 18.4 60.7 20.8 (21.8) (60.9) (17.3) 30.3 57.5 12.2
Spain 52.8 19.1 28.2 32.2 33.0 34.8 43.9 30.0 26.1
Sweden 15.7 55.1 29.2 16.6 50.3 33.1 23.0 46.1 30.9
United Kingdom 14.4 56.2 29.5 14.8 56.7 28.6 20.0 50.0 30.0
Notes: (i) Incomplete EU-27 average: education levels of natives do not include data for Bulgaria, Luxembourg and 
Romania; education levels of immigrants (born in an other EU-27 country or outside the EU-27) do not include data 
for Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Romania.  
Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size. 
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc modules, Eurostat; own calculations. 
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Citizen of the country of 
residence 
Citizen of an other  
EU-27 country 
Citizen of a country 
 outside EU-27 
 Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
EU-27(i) 25.2 50.1 24.7 31.2 41.8 26.9 45.5 35.3 19.2
Austria 17.4 64.7 17.9 11.7 58.2 30.1 50.0 39.5 10.5
Belgium 33.6 35.5 30.9 40.5 29.4 30.1 50.3 23.2 26.5
Cyprus 33.1 39.8 27.1 36.3 27.9 35.8 39.7 32.2 28.1
Czech Republic 10.1 76.9 13.0 9.2 66.7 24.1 17.2 50.4 32.3
Denmark 17.0 50.4 32.6 (11.3) 32.4 56.4 33.3 34.4 32.3
Estonia 11.2 54.0 34.9 : : : 9.7 61.8 28.5
Finland 20.8 44.6 34.6 24.4 48.3 27.3 31.0 45.5 23.5
France 32.0 42.7 25.4 52.1 24.8 23.0 62.4 21.8 15.8
Germany 13.4 61.3 25.3 34.1 45.2 20.8 50.8 34.4 14.8
Greece 40.1 39.1 20.8 28.9 52.0 19.1 48.2 38.1 13.8
Hungary 24.0 58.9 17.0 (13.4) 67.1 19.5 : 73.2 (20.5)
Ireland 36.5 35.8 27.7 22.3 35.6 42.1 13.7 28.2 58.1
Latvia 16.5 62.1 21.4 : : : : (70.1) :
Lithuania 12.9 60.6 26.5 : : : : (63.5) :
Malta 74.2 14.1 11.7 64.5 6.2 29.4 58.9 19.3 21.8
Netherlands 28.1 41.3 30.6 13.6 51.4 35.1 42.3 40.2 17.5
Poland 15.4 68.1 16.5 : (62.4) : : (46.5) (43.5)
Portugal 74.3 13.1 12.6 (40.6) (32.2) (27.3) 62.0 24.9 13.1
Slovakia 12.4 73.7 13.9 : : : : : :
Slovenia 19.5 60.5 20.0 : : : (27.6) (57.7) :
Spain 52.3 19.3 28.4 29.2 34.3 36.5 47.8 29.7 22.5
Sweden 16.1 54.7 29.2 17.9 48.4 33.6 28.7 37.3 34.0
United Kingdom 14.7 55.7 29.7 15.1 57.7 27.2 19.3 54.2 26.5
Notes: (i) Incomplete EU-27 average: education levels do not include data for Bulgaria, Italy, Luxemburg and 
Romania.  
Data in brackets are of limited reliability due to the small sample size. 
Source: European Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc modules, Eurostat; own calculations. 
 
34 
Notes: Incomplete EU-27 average: education levels of natives do not include data for Bulgaria, Luxemburg and Romania; education levels of immigrants (born in an other EU-27 country 
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Figure 3: Impact of immigration from third countries on the skill distribution of the population aged 15-to 64 in EU-27, 2005 
(increase/decrease in percent) 
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